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The economic analysis of tort law, like the economic analysis of law
generally, has both positive and normative dimensions.' Positive economic
analysis seeks to explain tort law by rationally reconstructing it: in other
words, by demonstrating how and to what extent existing doctrines fur-
ther economic efficiency. Normative economic analysis can be understood
as making either of two claims. In its modest version, normative economic
analysis makes a conditional claim: if the (or a) desirable goal of tort law
is to promote economic efficiency, then the rules of liability ought to be
such and such. In its ambitious version, normative economic analysis
drops the conditional, turning the hypothetical into a categorical impera-
tive: The rules of liability ought to be such and such.
All forms of the economic analysis of torts require specifying a model
from which one can derive the efficiency of various kinds of liability rules
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1. For an example of the positive dimension of tort law, see Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). For the normative, see generally G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCI-
DENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
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under different circumstances.2 The difference between positive and nor-
mative economic analysis lies in the use to which the model is put. The
point of positive economic analysis is to establish the extent to which ex-
isting law conforms to the model's implications. The point of normative
economic analysis is to argue for legal reform by showing how existing
law departs from the model's implications, or to rationalize existing law
by showing how it conforms to the model.'
I. TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS
Steven Shavell's Economic Analysis of Accident Law is devoted almost
entirely to specifying a model from which the efficiency of various rules of
liability can be derived. As the model increases in complexity, its implica-
tions become less determinate. In general, Shavell employs the model for
weakly normative purposes: If judges are to decide cases to promote effi-
ciency, then whether they should employ a strict or fault liability rule will
depend on various factors. For example, the model implies that in a one-
party accident, both strict and fault liability are efficient, whereas in a
two-party accident strict liability is inefficient.4 Strict liability with the
defense of contributory negligence, however, as well as simple negligence
and negligence with the defense of contributory negligence, is efficient in
the two-party case.
Does this mean that a judge seeking to promote efficiency should be
indifferent in choosing among equally efficient rules? No, Shavell asserts,
because the various liability rules differ in their informational require-
ments, distributional consequences and impact on the level of activity by
potential injurers and victims (activity levels). To apply a negligence rule,
a jury must know both the injurer's benefit schedule and the victim's dam-
age schedule. The reason: In efficiency terms, an actor is negligent only if
the expected damage of his conduct (as expressed by the victim's damage
schedule) exceeds his expected prevention costs (as expressed by his bene-
fit schedule). In contrast, under strict liability, the burden of deciding
whether an accident is worth its costs falls on injurers, not jurors. And in
each case, the injurer already has special access to his benefit schedule,
and need only determine the victim's damage schedule.5
To say that the rules of strict liability and negligence are equally effi-
cient in one-party accident cases means that, at a given level of the rele-
vant activity, both rules will lead to the same number of accidents. How-
2. See generally A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (1983).
3. Because economic analysis can provide a basis for economic reform, it is erroneous to assume
that it is inherently conservative, just as it is erroneous to assume that corrective justice analysis is
inherently re-distributive. See infra text accompanying notes 33-34.
4. See S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5-47 (1987).
5. There would be a higher number of cases under the strict liability rule, but the determination
of liability would be more costly under the negligence rule, and it is unclear which effect would
dominate. See S. SHAVELL, supra note 4, at 264.
1234 [Vol. 97: 1233
HeinOnline  -- 97 Yale L.J. 1234 1987-1988
Structure of Tort Law
ever, the rules differ in their effects on both wealth and activity levels.
The reason is straightforward. Under strict liability, the costs of faultless
accidents fall on injurers; under negligence, they fall on victims. Thus,
strict liability is costlier to injurers than to victims. Because strict liability
makes engaging in potentially harmful activities costlier to injurers than
negligence liability does, strict liability can be expected to reduce a ra-
tional injurer's output. If we restrict the domain of activities to those in
which the injurer and victim are engaged, strict liability would shift re-
sources from the injurer's activity to the victim's, thus reducing activity
levels of the former and raising those of the latter. The negligence rule
would have the opposite effect. Thus, the decision between strict and fault
liability will depend on a variety of factors: the costs of obtaining informa-
tion, the social desirability of various injury-causing activities, the preva-
lent attitudes toward risk, and the existence of insurance.
The strength of Shavell's book is its lucid, structured development and
explication of the economic model. It represents the best systematic pres-
entation of the relevance of economic argument for issues of risk alloca-
tion. On the other hand, the model's assumptions are not defended, nor is
its explanatory power fully explored. For example, Shavell does not take
up the question of whether real agents are or could be utility maximizers
in the narrow sense the model specifies. Nor is empirical evidence mar-
shalled to support the deterrence hypothesis: namely, that liability rules
have a substantial impact on deterrence in negligence cases. Very little of
the book is turned over to discussion of cases or doctrines. In fact, only a
paragraph or so in each section is devoted to summarizing the current
state of the law on the subject at hand. Moreover, on only a few occasions
does Shavell employ his model explicitly to explain the existing case law.
In contrast, William Landes and Richard Posner's The Economic
Structure of Tort Law makes the case for positive economic analysis of
torts in several areas of tort law, from accidents to defective products. In
their book, which is in fact a considerably revised collection of previously
published materials, the authors employ the methodology of their general
corpus of scholarship: They take the world as they find it, and they find it
(more or less) efficient. To be fair, Landes and Posner do retreat slightly
from their earlier micro claims on behalf of the efficiency of the common
law-that is, the efficiency of all manner of doctrine.6 Still, while the au-
thors may have modified particular claims for economic analysis' explana-
tory power, they indicate no intention of modifying the sweep of their
general claim on behalf of economic analysis of the law. Though particu-
lar doctrines or lines of cases may not fit neatly into the efficiency scheme,
there is apparently no area of law (or of life generally)' that cannot be
6. See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRU(rURE OF TORT LAW 23-24 (1987).
7. See id. at 157 (economic analysis of rape); see also E. Landes & Posner, The Economics of the
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illuminated by conceiving of it as promoting (or inhibiting) an efficient
allocation of resources.
Unlike many who employ economics for legal analysis, Richard Posner
deserves credit for confronting the issue of efficiency's normative under-
girding.' What, after all, makes efficiency normatively attractive? What
entitles courts (and legislatures) to exercise coercive authority to promote
efficiency, especially in areas of private law?9
Posner has not lost his zest for advocating the normative appeal of eco-
nomic efficiency, especially his version of it, social wealth maximization.
Though Landes and Posner present no systematic defense of the norma-
tive claims of efficiency, they clearly present their claims on behalf of effi-
ciency as both positive and normative. This collection is therefore a spir-
ited defense of economic analysis in a way that Shavell's book is not.
On the other hand, while Shavell's book is systematic, each section mo-
tivated by the preceeding one, the Landes/Posner collection is less success-
ful in its organization, motivation, and presentation. Some of their chap-
ters are very mathematical while others include no mathematics all.
(Whereas Shavell opens each chapter with a tidy narrative of his theory
and concludes each chapter with a mathematical appendix.)
Moreover, Landes and Posner ignore some important issues developed
by Shavell. One example is their concededly preemptive treatment of in-
surance in products liability.10 If one applies economic analysis to tort
doctrine, one can understand or justify liability rules only on grounds of
deterrence, insurance, or both. The authors assume that victims are either
risk neutral or that their insurance needs are elsewhere satisfied. If vic-
tims are risk neutral, they have no need for insurance. If they have a need
for insurance, but that need is satisfied in some other way, the insurance
rationale for strict products liability simply disappears. Given their as-
sumptions, Landes and Posner simply remove insurance from the feasible
set of possible explanations for strict products liability, leaving efficiency
in the form of deterrence as the only plausible alternative. Such a move
begs the question if it relies on the assumption of risk neutrality."' In
contrast, if it relies on the victims' insurance needs being elsewhere satis-
fied, thus rendering them de facto risk neutral with respect to defective
products, this move begs the more interesting question of whether we
Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978).
8. See R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
9. These questions may demand three answers: one to explain efficiency's normative attractive-
ness, one to legitimate its use as a principle of decision by judges, and one to legitimate its use as a
principle by legislators.
10. See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 6, at viii (book was completed before relevant
liability insurance literature explosion).
11. Another reviewer has made a similar objection. See Balkin, Too Good To Be True: The Posi-
tive Economic Theory of Law, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1447 (1987) (review of The Economic Structure of
Tort Law).
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would want insurance needs to be handled through liability rules for de-
fective products.12
Whatever the books' respective technical weaknesses, together they con-
stitute the most comprehensive defense of the economic analysis of tort law
currently available, and are strongly recommended accordingly.
II. THE EFFICIENCY HYPOTHESES
The claim that tort law is more or less efficient can be supported in at
least four distinct ways. First, the most general defense of the efficiency of
tort law follows from an even more general defense of the efficiency of
social norms. In this view, agents are assumed to pursue individually ra-
tional, utility-maximizing strategies. Under the very stringent and unreal-
istic assumptions of perfect competition, individually rational utility-
maximizing strategies converge on a Pareto-optimal or efficient outcome.
Normally, however, as a consequence of the fact that the payoffs one
secures from choosing a course of conduct depend on the choices of others,
agents pursuing respective individually rational strategies will be unable
to secure collectively efficient or rational outcomes. Individually rational
strategies often produce collectively irrational outcomes. The standard ex-
ample of this problem of individually rational strategies converging on an
inefficient equilibrium is the Prisoner's Dilemma." To avoid the ineffi-
ciency of pursuing individually rational but collectively irrational strate-
gies, agents must coordinate their activities. Rational cooperation consists
in agreement upon and general compliance with norms that act as con-
straints on individually rational strategies. To be rational, these normative
constraints must themselves be efficient. In the case of certain norms ra-
tional compliance requires the coercive enforcement of a legal order.
Thus, given the assumption of individual rationality, the legal norms that
emerge in society will tend to be efficient. For similar reasons, the norms
that prevail will tend to be efficient. For whenever a pattern of norms
exists that is inefficient, there exists an alternative pattern capable (by
definition) of making everyone better off. Over time, efficient and enforce-
able norms will drive out inefficient ones. Therefore, tort law, like law
generally, will converge on optimality."'
A second line of argument for the efficiency of tort law is suggested by
the first. It is often said of contract law, for example, that the default rule
judges apply to fill in the interstices of contracts is to confer those rights
12. See, e.g., Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521
(1987).
13. On the Prisoner's Dilemma see B. BARRY & R. HARDIN, RATIONAL MAN, IRRATIONAL
SoCiETY: AN INTRODUCTION AND SOURCEBOOK (1982); R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECI-
SION: INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY 94-97 (1957).
14. The so-called "folk theorem" holds that any outcome (efficient or not) can be sustained as an
equilibrium in repeated play. So it doesn't follow that inefficient practices or rules will necessarily be
driven out by efficient ones. This is also the conclusion derived by common sense.
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and impose those responsibilities that the parties would have bargained
for ex ante. The argument for the default rule rests on two ideas: the fully
specified contract and transaction costs. A fully specified contract is, by
definition, efficient. Because the costs of fully specifying a contract are too
high, rational parties do not specify all of a contract's terms. Transaction
costs make a fully specified contract irrational. Where the contract does
not specify correlative rights and duties, the court imposes those which the
parties would have bargained for in the absence of transaction costs. But a
rational fully specified contract is efficient, so a judge should in applying
the default rule impose efficient contractual terms on the parties. What
does all this have to do with tort law? We can characterize tort law as
necessary only because contracting is too costly. Transaction costs make
tort law inevitable in the same way, and for the same reasons, that they
make a fully specified contract impossible. For example, automobile driv-
ers cannot plausibly contract with all those individuals who might be put
at risk by their negligence. Thus, tort law is necessary to protect rights not
adequately secured by a regime of contract. This is just another way of
stating the standard economic argument for the move from property to
liability rules.1 5 Tort law is a response to contract failure owing to high
transaction costs. And in contract, high transaction costs require applica-
tion of the default rule; thus, the general principle for assigning rights and
responsibilities in tort is the default rule writ large. Whereas in contract
judges are forced on occasion to ask themselves what the parties would
have agreed to ex ante, all of tort law consists of those rules of liability
which the parties would have chosen ex ante. Because the ex ante contract
is modeled as a rational bargain, and because optimality is a necessary
condition of rational bargaining, the rules of tort liability are to be inter-
preted by judges employing the generalized "ex ante contract" device as
promoting efficiency."
The striking feature of these two accounts of the efficiency of tort law is
that they have nothing to do with any particular tort law doctrine. In the
first account, the efficiency of tort law derives from a general rational
choice theory of efficient norms." In the second, the efficiency of tort law
follows from the ex ante contract as a device rendering tort doctrine
coherent.
The argument from the efficiency of social norms marks one end of the
explanatory spectrum. At the other end of the spectrum lies the third
15. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089-90 (1972); Coleman, The Economic Analysis of Law, in
NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 83 J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1985);
Klevorick, The Economics of Crime, in NOMOS XVII: CRIMINAL JUSTICE 289 (J. Pennock & J.
Chapman eds. 1985).
16. See, e.g., Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97
YALE L.J. 353 (1988).
17. Coleman, Market Contractarianism, 2 Soc. PHIL & POL'Y (1984).
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(least abstract and least plausible) argument for tort law's efficiency: In
deciding particular cases, a judge will invariably ask herself, what does
efficiency tell me about which party ought to be liable in this case? In this
view, tort cases invite judges to formulate social policy. Litigants are not
people demanding decisions as a matter of right; rather, they are instru-
ments in the pursuit of a global policy. Their claims are not constraints
on, but opportunities for, judges.
No one seriously advances the view that judges in tort cases throughout
history have engaged directly in the forms of economic argument which
cast litigants as instruments in a larger cost/benefit calculation. Neverthe-
less, judges may increasingly do so, especially those who have been stu-
dents in one or another mini-course on economic analysis for judges.
What is required is a fourth account of tort law's efficiency, one rooted
in practice and doctrine yet not reliant upon the implausible claim that
tort law is efficient because judges have always decided particular cases by
putting economic argument in legal terms. This explanation begins by
drawing the obvious distinction between liability based on the injurer's
fault (fault liability) and strict liability. Does there exist a coherent princi-
ple or set of principles that can account for both strict and fault liability?
The obvious difference between strict and fault liability suggests it
would be hard to find a single, internally coherent principle that would
explain and justify both-both a faultless injurer's liability in some cases
(strict liability) and his freedom from liability in others (negligence). Eco-
nomic analysis appears to provide one solution to the problem. When an
injurer is strictly liable, he is required to internalize the full social costs of
his activity. That puts the burden on the actor of deciding whether the
marginal benefit of engaging in the activity exceeds its expected marginal
cost. If it does, the actor will engage in the activity and compensate his
victims. If it does not, the actor will not undertake the action.
From the point of view of efficiency, those are the decisions we want
the agent to make. For in the first case his decision to engage in the
threatening conduct reflects the efficiency of the expected outcome: Ex-
pected marginal benefit exceeds expected marginal cost. Similarly, in the
second case, his decision not to act in a harmful way reflects the ineffi-
ciency of the expected outcome of his doing so: Expected marginal cost
would exceed expected marginal benefit. Whenever a rule of strict liability
is employed, then, it has the effect of forcing injurers to internalize the
social costs of their activities. Internalizing costs thus ensures that parties
will act in injurious ways only when efficiency would permit (and re-
quire) them to do so. Where strict liability exists, it can be justified in
efficiency terms.
So can fault liability. What makes an agent's conduct negligent? Ac-
cording to Learned Hand's simple mathematical formulation of the duty
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of care in United States v. Carroll Towing,"8 potential injurers are re-
quired to take only cost-justified precautions. Whenever the cost of pre-
vention is less than the potential harm discounted by the probability of the
harm's occurrence, precautions are obligatory. Failure to take obligatory,
efficient precautions is negligence. Negligence liability forces actors to in-
ternalize the social costs of their (lack of) investment in accident preven-
tion measures. Whenever the expected value of the harm exceeds the
agent's expected benefit from not investing in adequate precautions, he
will be held liable for the harm, thereby forcing him to change his calcu-
lation of costs and benefits.19 Thus wherever a rule of negligence liability
exists, it can be rationally reconstructed in efficiency terms, whether or
not judges or juries in particular cases have engaged in explicit economic
argument.
Once the general framework of strict and fault liability is given an eco-
nomic rationale, everything else becomes a matter of engineering, of fine-
tuning the liability rules to their most appropriate circumstances--as
Shavell's model does.
Given these fairly compelling accounts of tort law's fundamental effi-
ciency, what is left for noneconomic theories? What aspects of tort law
could alternative theories hope to explain that economics cannot? What
might a competing theory explain better than economics does?
III. THE STRUCTURE OF JUSTICE
A. The Argument Against Economic Analysis
We should begin by distinguishing substantive from formal or struc-
tural dimensions of tort law. The doctrine of strict liability for ul-
trahazardous activities is a substantive feature of tort law; the fact that
disputes are resolved on a case by case basis in which the question who
should bear an accident's costs is normally restricted to plaintiff-victims
and defendant-injurers, is a formal or structural feature. A full theoretical
reconstruction of tort or accident law will provide an analysis of both its
substantive and formal features. An advocate of a noneconomic theory of
tort law, then, might hold that noneconomic factors, for example consider-
ations of corrective justice, provide a better account of either (1) tort law's
central substantive doctrines or (2) its fundamental structural constraints
(and as good an account of the other). Most advocates of a corrective jus-
tice account of tort law, including Richard Epstein,2" George Fletcher,2'
Ernest Weinrib,22 and myself,2" have tried primarily to make good on the
18. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
19. We are assuming that the agent's calculus includes the probability of (non)enforcement.
20. See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973).
21. See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HAItv. L. Rv. 537 (1972).
22. See Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37 (1983).
23. See Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits Part II, 2 LAW & PHIL. 5
(1983).
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first of these claims: specifically, that certain substantive requirements for
liability and recovery in tort law are best understood as enforcing an ideal
of justice between the parties, or that political authority is justifiably exer-
cised only if the duties imposed by tort law express requirements of jus-
tice, not economics.
I now wish to address the question of whether noneconomic theories of
tort law, especially those that rely on principles of corrective justice and
personal responsibility, provide a better explanation of the following
structural feature of tort law: Tort suits bring victim-plaintiffs together
with injurer-defendants, and only within this structured context do ques-
tions regarding who should bear a particular accident's costs arise. That
is, the goals of compensation, deterrence and insurance are pursued only
within an established structure: the structure of case-by-case adjudication
between individual victims and their respective injurers. Does the theory
of corrective justice provide a better account than does economic analysis
of this structure of who pays?
A first response is that corrective justice must provide a better account
of tort law's structure than economic analysis because economic analysis
provides no explanation at all. To the economist, tort law is a pliable
instrument in pursuit of optimal deterrence, optimal insurance or both.
But neither of these policies requires nor otherwise adequately explains
why the liability decision must be restricted to particular defendants and
plaintiffs. Indeed, because determining who is the best insurer or cheapest
cost avoider is always an empirical inquiry, it is not even obvious that
injurers and their victims should be invariably included in the set of can-
didates for tort liability, let alone that the set should be restricted to them.
The problem with any form of economic explanation goes deeper, for
economic analysis' inadequacy results from its fundamentally forward-
looking conception of liability running into a structure of litigation that
embodies an essentially backward-looking theory of liability and recovery.
This backward-looking dimension of existing tort law limits the extent to
which it can be used to pursue economic goals.
Thus, tort law asks whether A who harmed B should be liable to B in
damages, or whether B should be made to bear the costs. However that
decision is made, it will be structured in terms of A and B, two parties
whose presence before the court is a consequence of a past event: namely,
what B alleges A did. In contrast, the search for optimal insurers or
cheapest cost avoiders is not similarly constrained by history. Accidents
between A and B may in fact be most easily prevented by C. Consider as
an example automobile accidents. Whenever A rams his car into B, B
brings suit against A. And on the economic analysis we are then to decide
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whether A or B is the person who is in the best position to reduce acci-
dents of this type. Yet the party best suited to optimize accident costs may
be neither A nor B, the only parties the law considers. Instead, the cheap-
est cost avoider may well be the relevant car manufacturer(s), who is (are)
party neither to the accident nor to the litigation.24
On the face of it, neither considerations of optimal deterrence nor of
insurance requires us to structure litigation so that only victims and their
injurers are liability candidates. Yet this structure of litigation is surely
one of tort law's essential characteristics. Economic analysis can therefore
only assume, but never explain, the structure of tort law. To that extent,
it constitutes an incomplete theory of tort law.
B. The Legal Economist's Reply
There are three responses the legal economist could make to this objec-
tion. The first response would accept both the centrality of the injurer-
victim structure of litigation and our ordinary understanding of the key
concepts of injurer and victim, but provide an economic explanation of
both. The second response would deny that the injurer-victim structure of
tort law is as central a feature of tort law as the objection makes it out to
be. 5 The third response would be to accept the centrality of the injurer-
victim structure, but offer an economic analysis of the terms "victim" and
"injurer." Such an analysis might have the effect of infusing economics'
forward-looking impetus into tort law's backward-looking structure (for
example, in this view, the injurer might be (re)defined as the cheapest cost
avoider). 6
Consider the first response. Is there a compelling economic explanation
of tort law's structuring of the problem of who pays? We can begin by
asking why structures for answering questions of liability for loss always
include the victim. One reason for making a victim party to the litigation
is that by doing so we provide him with an incentive to bring an action. If
the injured party does not initiate litigation, the court is not given the
opportunity to pursue optimal risk reduction or spreading. In order to
provide courts with the opportunity to seek efficient accident reduction
someone must initiate litigation. A victim will only do so if he stands to
gain thereby. The possibility of securing compensation for his loss pro-
vides the requisite incentive. I shall call this "the private enforcement
argument."
24. I do not refer to cases in which a defect in the car is the harms cause, but rather to cases like
the following. Suppose three factors influence the number and severity of automobile accidents: roads,
cars and drivers. It's just possible that the cheapest way to reduce accident costs is to put losses on
manufacturers regardless of their responsibility for particular accidents. By doing so we might en-
courage manufacturers to lobby for safer roads and to adjust their cars for unsafe drivers.
25. See infra text accompanying note 10.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 35-36 for a development of this view.
1242 [Vol. 97: 1233
HeinOnline  -- 97 Yale L.J. 1242 1987-1988
Structure of Tort Law
A second reason to include victims in the litigation is that we want to
encourage them to take optimal safety measures. This is the deterrence
argument. It has two components. First, we sometimes put victims in a
position of liability to encourage them to take precautions. Second, we put
victims in a position of recovery when otherwise they would be induced to
take too many precautions. Thus, victims are always relevant to decisions
about who pays, and structures designed to resolve these questions must
always include victims.
Once the victim is included, two questions remain: (1) Why include
injurers? (2) Why include only victims and injurers? The obvious eco-
nomic reason for including injurers is deterrence. If injurers are freed
from potential liability, their incentive to take precautions is dramatically
reduced. Victims are included to give them incentives to litigate, to take
precautions, or both; injurers are included to give them incentives to take
precautions. No one else is included because the cost of searching for bet-
ter risk reducers or spreaders from the populace at large is too high. This
last argument rests on two empirical premises. The first is that the choice
set comprised of the injurer and victim contains at least one and perhaps
two plausible candidates for securing the ends of efficiency; the second is
that while other more plausible, even significantly better candidates may
exist in individual cases, in categories of cases, or perhaps in all cases, the
costs of identifying them and making them parties to actions are generally
too high. Thus, the fact that in tort law the set of potentially liable parties
is restricted to victims and their injurers can be given an explanation con-
sistent with the general form of economic argument.
These are plausible economic arguments for restricting the liability de-
cision to victims and their particular injurers. Thus, the objection that
economics lacks an explanation of tort law's structure is unfounded. The
question is whether the explanation the economist offers is persuasive.
The private enforcement argument presupposes the necessity of at least
some private enforcement as a prerequisite for optimal deterrence. If pri-
vate enforcement were not necessary for optimal deterrence, then no need
would exist to present judges with the opportunity to use civil actions for
this particular public end. Then, if civil actions initiated by victims were
desirable, their desirability could not be explained by optimal deterrence.
Were we able to reach injurers more cheaply in some other way, victim-
instigated suits in torts would be inexplicable from an economic point of
view. Second, it may not be true that if a victim fails to bring suit to
recover damages, courts would be disabled from pursuing the private en-
forcement of public norms. We could simply give other parties incentive to
litigate. Including victims in the choice set is neither necessary nor suffi-
cient for the optimal enforcement argument. More important, economic
analysis renders the victim's place in tort law radically contingent and far
too tenuous to explain its centrality to our actual practice.
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The deterrence argument, that victims are included so that we may in-
duce them to take efficient precautions and to avoid taking inefficient pre-
cautions, rests on the mistaken premise that including someone in litiga-
tion is the only way to influence her behavior.27 In a system of precedent,
individuals not themselves parties to civil or other actions alter their be-
havior as a consequence of legal rules. If the only way we could influence
someone to take safety measures were through tort liability, and if the
costs of being made party to litigation were nil, then we should include
nearly everyone in nearly every action. Once all the relevant facts were
available-that is, once we knew who in a particular case is the cheapest
cost avoider, best insurer, etc.-we could determine in each case who to
hold liable. But that's just not the way tort law structures the problem.
Not everyone is a potential candidate for liability in every case. Victims
and injurers are almost always candidates, however, while almost no one
else ever is.
The private enforcement argument does not require the victim's inclu-
sion in the structure of litigation. One need not be a victim in order to be
given incentive to litigate. Moreover, because the argument presupposes
the desirability of private enforcement, alternative means of promoting op-
timal deterrence leave the victim's place in litigation completely unex-
plained. Thus, the centrality of the victim to tort litigation is lost. The
deterrence argument, that victims are always included because sometimes
we may want to influence them to take safety measures, attempts to rein-
troduce the victim's centrality to the structure of the problem. It also fails;
first, because one need not be a party to litigation to be influenced by its
outcome; second, because if we had to include individuals in litigation in
order to influence their behavior, we should want prima facie to include
everyone in litigation whenever the costs of doing so were sufficiently low.
Surely the economist would agree. In principle, because the search for
the cheapest cost avoider or best insurer requires empirical inquiry, there
is no reason why the decision of who should bear the costs of particular
accidents should be restricted to victims or injurers. However, considera-
tions of administrative efficiency narrow the domain considerably so that
in most cases the decision is structured in terms of identifiable injurers
and identifiable victims. It follows, of course, that there is nothing sacred
about the structure. As the costs of identifying third parties better suited
to avoid or to spread risks decrease, we should expect alterations in the
structure of litigation, or, in some cases, the abandonment of tort litigation
entirely. That is, we would expect to find cheapest cost avoiders increas-
ingly becoming parties to litigation even when they bear no causal or
other responsibility for the harm of which the victim complains. Or we
27. For a constitutional law analogue to this mistaken premise, see Meese, The Law of the Consti-
tution, 61 TUL. L. REv. 979, 983 (1987).
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would expect to find a reduction in the incidence of resolution through
litigation in favor of some other form for reaching the cheapest cost
avoider, for example, regulation-a different structure. The economist
would now make the second response: In fact there is no fixed structure of
tort litigation that needs explanation. Tort litigation can take many forms.
The form of litigation depends on tort law's substantive ambitions. Struc-
ture is determined by substance constrained by factual limits. Changes in
either variable result in changes in structure.
In effect, the economist's response to the objection that economic analy-
sis merely assumes and cannot adequately explain the structure of tort
litigation has two components. First, the economist denies the premise of
the argument, that there is a structure of tort litigation that requires ex-
planation. Rather, there are many structures. Second, the structure the
corrective justice theorist is so fond of-case-by-case, victim-injurer litiga-
tion-can be given an economic explanation. That way of structuring de-
cisions about who should bear the costs of accidents is one very natural
response to any attempt to pursue optimal deterrence and insurance
within certain constraints. The economist's explanation, moreover, has
predictive implications: changes in constraints or aims should yield altera-
tions in structure. To make matters worse for the corrective justice theo-
rist, we observe many of the structural changes the economic theory
predicts.28
The economist does not pretend that she can explain the necessity of the
structure of litigation, only its plausibility. Given the costs of locating
third parties, the victim-injurer structure of tort litigation provides a plau-
sible framework within which the law can pursue the aims of optimal risk
reduction and spreading.
If the objection to economics is that such a structure is not simply a
plausible way of securing the aims of tort law, but that it is a necessary
feature of it, the economist's response would be to deny the premise. The
injurer-victim structure makes considerable sense; it may not, however, be
central to tort law; it is surely not necessary to it.
We began by chastising the economist for her inability to explain cen-
tral structural features of tort law. In piecing together a plausible re-
sponse to this objection, we find ourselves on the defensive. For the econo-
mist has an explanation of the structure of litigation, but one which views
it as subordinate to the law's substantive ambitions. Moreover, what the
objection takes as fixed and given, the economic analysis reveals to be fluid
and derivative. Current trends in tort law altering not only the scope of
liability and recovery, but the structure of litigation as well, lend further
28. For example, changes in products liability, including enterprise liability, see generally Priest,
The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern
Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 681 (1985), and the development of market share liability, see Sindell
v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
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credence to the economist's position. Is there a position left for the propo-
nent of corrective justice worth staking out? In fact, there are at least two.
One strategy for the corrective justice theorist would be to abandon the
view that the structure of tort litigation is best understood as advancing
the goal of corrective justice in favor of the claim that the substantive
doctrines of tort law are matters of corrective justice. This is the view that
the substance of tort law is a matter of justice, though its structure may
well be a matter of economics. Substance may constrain structure, but it
does not compel it. The structure of tort litigation represents a compro-
mise; given the costs of alternatives, it is the best available way of securing
the aims of corrective justice.29
Another strategy is to reassert the centrality of structure to the aims of
corrective justice. The argument is this: The problem with economic anal-
ysis is not that it provides no explanation at all of tort law's structure.
Rather, in the analysis it provides, the victim and injurer are only contin-
gently and tenuously connected to tort law's substantive aims. Only cor-
rective justice makes real sense of the structure of tort law, because only
corrective justice explains this structure as logically connected to the law's
substantive ambitions. Corrective justice compels a particular structure.
To the extent economic analysis lauds departures from the structure as
evidence of institutional plasticity, corrective justice laments them as mis-
takes, or in some few cases, as justifiable departures from the demands of
justice. There are two distinct senses in which a corrective justice theorist
might view departures from the injurer-victim structure as mistakes: in
one sense the mistake is normative, in another sense it is conceptual.
The normative argument begins with the observation that much of tort
law can be explained by seeing it as embodying an ideal of corrective
justice. More importantly, tort law can be justified only it it seeks to pro-
mote the aims of justice. For law involves the coercive exercise of political
authority, and that authority is warranted only within the bounds of jus-
tice. To employ the state's power to maximize wealth or otherwise to pro-
mote efficiency is illegitimate. This is a decidedly normative argument,
which can take either of two forms. In the strong form of the argument,
the legitimate purpose of tort law is to do justice; in its weaker form,
corrective justice establishes a side-constraint on any other of tort law's
ambitions. In neither form does the argument contest the explanatory
power of economic analysis. The argument merely regrets its accuracy.
For to the extent tort law departs unjustifiably from the requirements of
justice, it involves the illegitimate use of power. To the extent that depar-
tures from the individualist structure of litigation are departures from the
requirements of corrective justice, tort law makes a (normative) mistake.
The sense in which extending the net of liability and the forms of liti-
29. See Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421 (1982).
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gation constitute conceptual mistakes is based on the view that tort law in
particular, and private law more generally, embody a certain kind of
structure. This formalist conception of tort law is espoused primarily by
Ernest Weinrib.Y For him, relations and concepts have an internal logic
or structure which specify constraints on their coherent use. The key con-
cepts involved in tort law, for example "wrongdoing" and "causation,"
have an internal logic that jointly specifies constraints on their use in in-
stitutional settings. One simply cannot call everybody one wants to sue an
"injurer" any more than one can call every sort of relationship "causal."
For Weinrib, these constraints specify a particular structure of litigation
he associates with the formal concept of corrective justice. That structure
approximately coincides with the case-by-case/victim-injurer scheme of
tort litigation. Departures from that scheme, as in mass torts, market
share and products liability are wrong, not necessarily morally, but con-
ceptually. They are an inappropriate structural embodiment of the rele-
vant concepts. Consequently, the further tort law moves away from indi-
vidually structured litigation, whatever the motivation and merits of its
doing so, the less it is "tort law." This formalist position is probably best
summarized by Weinrib's view that tort law itself has no purpose, that,
instead, its only responsibility is to be tort law-which is to say, to have a
certain structure, one defined by the conditions of coherence and logic in
the use of its central concepts.31
We have, in effect, a spectrum of views about tort law's structure. At
one end is the economic analysis according to which tort law, qua tort
law, has no inherent structure. Tort law is a social construct designed to
serve certain substantive human ends. Those ends define the structure tort
law takes over time. This is the radical instrumentalist position implicit in
the proposition that institutional forms are (in theory) infinitely pliable:
their shape, at any moment a function of social constraints and human
desires.
At the other end of the spectrum, we have the anti-instrumentalist-for-
malist position represented by Weinrib. In this view, tort law is social
structure whose coherence as structure is constrained, not by ambition or
contingency, but by the logic of its central concepts. The constraints of
language are as powerful as are the constraints of history. Structure con-
strains substance; and structure, while not given by God or Nature, is
nevertheless given a priori, by the logic of the concepts.
Given the spread between these two polar opposites, just about every-
thing else can be said to occupy the middle ground. The next Section
outlines and defends such a middle position.
30. See Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949
(1988).
31. See Weinrib, The Insurance Justification and Private Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 681 (1985).
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IV. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND THE STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
In my view, tort law is a social construct designed by humans to serve
certain purposes. Its ability legitimately to serve those purposes depends
on its satisfying certain side-constraints, in particular the principle of cor-
rective justice. While it does not require a particular form of litigation, the
principle of corrective justice constrains the forms of litigation. Moreover,
the principle of corrective justice, as I will specify it, gives a better account
of the core form of litigation than does economic analysis. The relation-
ship between victim and injurer which in the ordinary view is central to
understanding litigation becomes, in the economic view, tenuous and radi-
cally contingent. Corrective justice, as I understand it, suggests a deeper
connection between victims and injurers than any economic analysis
allows.
Corrective justice requires that wrongful gains and losses be annulled.32
The principle of corrective justice is thus both backward-looking and con-
servative. It is backward-looking because it seeks to recompense individu-
als in order to annul their undeserved losses, not to influence their future
behavior. Of course, compensating those who are entitled to repair and
not compensating those who are not will affect the behavior of both; no
one denies that. The point of compensation, however, is not to influence
future behavior, but to annul wrongfully inflicted losses. The principle of
corrective justice is conservative in the sense that one may invoke it to
rectify departures from patently unjust distributions of resources when the
departures are wrongfully created." Consider the following example. Im-
agine B is very wealthy and A extremely poor, and that this state of af-
fairs is unjust according to distributive justice. (Suppose, for simplicity,
that A and B should be equally endowed.) Poor A negligently or recklessly
rains his car into rich B and reduces B's wealth so much that A and B are
now roughly equally well off. The new state of affairs is in some sense
more distributively just than the former. Nevertheless, in my view, B has
a valid claim that he has suffered a wrongful loss and is, therefore, enti-
tled as a matter of corrective justice to its repair.
I draw two other distinctions regarding corrective justice relevant to this
discussion. The first is the difference between the grounds of recovery and
the grounds of liability. B may be entitled to repair as a matter of correc-
tive justice if A wrongfully creates his loss. However, if A secures no gain
through his harming B, then A has secured no gain that corrective justice
requires he forfeit. So if he is to be liable to B, his liability cannot be a
matter of corrective justice. A's liability and B's recovery have different
normative bases. Second, I distinguish between the grounds of rectifica-
32. See Coleman, supra note 23.
33. For a contrast of the potential conservatism of corrective justice with the redistributive reform-
ism of economic analysis, see supra note 3.
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tion (and liability) and modes of rectification (and liability). Corrective
justice tells us which gains and losses must be annulled as a matter of
justice: after the victim's grounds of recovery have been established (the
necesary but insufficient predicate for recovery), the grounds for liability
on the part of the injurer must be established. Corrective justice does not
tell us what mode we should use to rectify them, though particular con-
ceptions of corrective justice may restrict our choice among alternative
modes of rectification."'
Many substantive features of existing tort law can be illuminated by
understanding them as embodying ideals of corrective justice. However,
because corrective justice does not specify a particular mode of rectifica-
tion, we cannot claim that all of tort law's structural features are easily
derived from corrective justice. Corrective justice does require, however,
that a person's claim to recompense be vindicated by an institutional
structure. Tort law is one such structure for identifying and vindicating
legitimate claims to compensation. A claim to compensation is a matter of
corrective justice if the loss the claimant seeks recompense for is wrongful,
that is, if it results from another's wrongdoing-for example, another's
negligence.
Given that tort law is a legal device for determining whether certain
claims to compensation are legitimate as a matter of justice, it is plain
why much of tort law takes the shape it does. The reason the victim
brings to court his injurer, rather than bringing the world of potentially
cheaper cost avoiders, is that his claim to compensation as a matter of
justice is analytically connected to some facts he seeks to establish about
the injurer's conduct. In particular, in most cases his claim is valid only if
he can show that his loss is the result of the injurer's fault. To the extent
tort law is a forum for vindicating claims to repair, the victim's connection
to his injurer is fundamental and analytic, not tenuous or contingent. That
his injurer acted towards him in a way that gives rise to a legitimate claim
in justice to compensation is the heart of the victim's assertion. This asser-
tion connects the victim and his injurer in an analytic way: they are con-
nected to one another and to no one else, in a way that makes a kind of
sense of the structure of tort law that economic analysis simply cannot.
It is easy to misunderstand my position as endorsing the view that tort
law requires a particular structure. Instead my view is that the principle
34. The general point is that corrective justice constrains the mode of rectification in the sense that
no scheme of rectification can create gains or losses that themselves, from the point of view of correc-
tive justice, ought to be annulled. Permissible modes of rectification will depend, therefore, on the
relevant characterization of "wrongful loss." For example, suppose one adopts the view that any
nonconsensual taking creates a wrongful loss (and gain). Then, if in order to compensate B for his
wrongful loss, we take from the rich without their consent, in doing so we create wrongful losses
which, from the point of view of corrective justice, must be annulled. Such a scheme of rectification
would be incompatible with that conception of corrective justice, but perhaps compatible with others,
for example with those that do not entail the view that any unconsented-to taking creates a wrongful
loss.
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of corrective justice requires answers to two distinct questions: one having
to do with the grounds of recovery and liability, the other having to do
with the mode of recovery and liability. Current tort law has one institu-
tional form designed to answer both of these questions. The structure of
tort litigation, bringing victims together with injurers, is best explained by
corrective justice's requirement that we identify legitimate claims to re-
pair: grounds for the victim's recovery, and grounds for the injurer's lia-
bility. Only those claims require rectification as a matter of corrective jus-
tice. Corrective justice renders the relationship between victim and injurer
analytic; economic analysis fails to do so.
The legitimacy of a victim's claim to repair in economic analysis de-
pends on the effects of compensation on his willingness to litigate or to
take safety precautions, not on some connection between the injurer and
him. The same is true of the injurer. The legitimacy of holding him liable
depends on the economic consequences of doing so, not on some connection
between the victim and him. The relevance of his having done something
to the victim is epistemic at best, for it may provide some evidence of the
injurer being someone who needs to take additional safety measures. That
evidence can be overcome by other evidence that someone else is in a bet-
ter position to reduce accidents than he is.
The relationship between injurers and victims in economic analysis is
never really a relationship between injurers and victims but is instead a
relationship between injurers and the goals of tort law and victims and
the goals of tort law. Because of this, it is easy to see why economists find
it so easy to make the third response: to redefine concepts like injurer and
causation in purely economic terms, as we shall see.
Corrective justice provides a sense in which an analytic connection be-
tween injurers and victims matters. But only one dimension of corrective
justice does that, namely the need to determine the legitimacy of claims to
repair. Once an individual has a legitimate claim to repair, corrective jus-
tice does not require that he be compensated by his injurer. It is the basis
of the claims-to-repair dimension of corrective justice, not the mode-of-
rectification dimension of it, that explains tort law's structure.
In my view, corrective justice does not require a victim-injurer institu-
tional form for deciding who pays whom, though it may require such a
form to determine who has a right to repair and who, if anyone, has a
duty to pay. How these rights and duties are to be discharged is a further
question. It may be a matter of administrative efficiency to lump the two
questions together in one institutional form. However, I contend it is not a
requirement of justice.
Compare this argument for the structural feature of tort law with the
economic one. In the corrective justice argument the victim brings an ac-
tion against his injurer because the victim's claim to compensation as a
matter of justice is based on his claims about what the injurer did to him,
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not on the fact that the injurer is better suited than he is to reduce acci-
dent costs. If it suddenly turned out that some third party were the cheap-
est cost avoider, there would be no reason as a matter of corrective justice
for including him in the suit. Nothing about the cheapest cost avoider's
prior behavior has anything at all to do with the victim's claim to recom-
pense being a matter of justice. On the other hand, when the goals of
deterrence and insurance are no longer constrained by concerns to reduce
administrative costs, there is no purely economic reason for preventing the
victim from suing the cheapest cost avoider. Thus, even if the current
structure of tort litigation is consistent with economic analysis, it is better
understood as embodying some conception of corrective justice. For as long
as tort suits are so structured, even when their being so is made plausible
by the higher administrative costs of alternatives, we can understand that
structure as embodying the ideal that in torts a victim seeks to show that
the loss he has suffered is a wrongful one, one which requires recompense
as a matter of right, not utility. And central to that claim is showing that
the loss results from the mischief of the defendant.
To this objection the legal economist might make the third response, the
third line of defense to the charge that she cannot explain tort law's struc-
ture. The argument for corrective justice I just outlined depends on the
existence of pre-theoretical conceptions of the terms "victim," injurer" and
"causation," such that it makes sense to say that the injurer, who was not
the cheapest cost avoider or best insurer, caused the victim harm for which
he rightly seeks redress. In fact, the economist responds, there are no clear
pre-theoretic conceptions of these terms. The economist, after all, is sim-
ply an instrumentalist. Not only is tort law as a practice or institutional
form infinitely pliable, but so are its basic concepts. The notions of "in-
jurer" and "causation" can be given economic interpretations or mean-
ings. For example, the "injurer" in any given case is not necessarily the
chap who smashed the poor fellow over the head, but is instead that indi-
vidual who could have prevented the head-smashing incident at the lowest
cost. The concept of causation is as empty as that of injurer. We are free,
therefore, to give an economic rendition of it. After all, the objection that
economic analysis cannot explain the backward-looking structure of tort
litigation presupposes a non-economic meaning of the key terms: injurer,
victim, fault and causation. But all these terms can be given economic
renderings. Once these concepts have been reconstructed from an eco-
nomic point of view, the conflict between the backward-looking structure
of tort litigation and the forward-looking aims of economic analysis evapo-
rates. The sentence "The injurer wrongfully caused the victim's loss,"
which appears to express a proposition about past events that may only
contingently be connected with the economic aims of cost avoidance is,
through the magic of economic reconstruction, analytically connected to it.
The wrongful injurer is by definition the cheapest cost avoider, and the
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causal connection between his act and the victim's loss is spelled out in
terms of some statistical relationship whose normative significance is also
a matter of economic policy.
The obvious problem with such an enterprise is that by reconstructing
the key concepts of tort liability in economic terms, economic analysis
could hardly be said to be providing an explanation of legal practice as it
finds it. Instead, it finds the practice void of content and constraint,
remakes it in economic terms, and then quite unsurprisingly provides an
economic analysis of it. Nowhere is this intellectual practice more common
than it is in the economic analysis of causation. If serious legal theorists
bemoan the Critical Legal Studies movement's fixation on law's indeter-
minacy, they have only the economists of law and other rampant recon-
structionists to blame. For it was economic analysis and not Critical Legal
Studies that first treated legal concepts as if they could be remade at will
in the light of one's preferred normative theory.
If we are to explain our social and legal practices we must assume that
they have a content that is the object of explanation, a content that con-
strains what can count as an adequate explanation of it. Surely there will
be aspects of a practice or a concept that will be contestable or controver-
sial, that require affirmative acts of interpretation. 5 These interpretations
will aim to give structure and coherence to our practices, and in doing so,
they may invoke normative premises. But it does not follow from the fact
that a normative theory is required to settle controversial cases, that the
uncontroversial cases or settled aspects of a practice impose no constraints
whatsoever on the shape and substance interpretive theories can take. The
fact that there are hard or controversial cases in which genuine doubt
about the meaning of "injurer" or of "causation" exists provides no excuse
for remaking entire concepts. If controversy were to provide an invitation
to remake altogether our concepts and practices by the lights of our nor-
mative theoretical commitments, we could hardly be said, by invoking
those theories, to have explained those practices. For part of the argument
for radical reconstruction is that, in a suitable sense, there is no practice to
explain: there is no there there. One literally cannot have it both ways.
To say that practices constrain their explanations or that concepts have
content independent of normative theories is not to align oneself fully with
the formalist. Practices have significance and concepts have meaning.
From that it does not follow that the meaning of the concepts are fixed or
that they must constrain the form of the practice. Some concepts, such as
"responsibility," "victim" and "wrongdoer," derive their meanings in part
from the practices in which they figure. More important, conceptual
moves cannot decide normative disputes. One is reminded of the debate
about the legitimacy of punishing the innocent. At one time, the objection
35. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
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was made to utilitarian theories of punishment that they could sometimes
justify punishing the innocent. One response to these objections was that
utilitarianism could do no such thing since punishment, by definition, was
an act of the state against a guilty person. Thus, the objection must be
misplaced. This argumentative move was given a name-the definitional
stop-and rejected accordingly. No conceptual move can solve a normative
dispute. Whatever we call the practice of imprisoning innocent peo-
ple-punishment or "telishment"-the question remains whether utilita-
rianism endorses it, and whether, if it does, that weighs heavily or deci-
sively against it. 6
Most tort theorists, myself included, want to know whether a practice
that imposes liability without regard to fault is a good or defensible one,
not whether it accurately reflects a pre-institutional analysis of the con-
cepts of fault and causation. We want to know whether the constraints of
the normative concept of corrective justice permit the net of tort liability to
extend further and further, not whether in doing so tort law ceases to be
tort law.
In fairness to Weinrib, he does not commit the fallacy of the defini-
tional stop, for he does not mean to resolve any issues on the merits by
appealing to the logic or definition of the concepts or to the structures
those concepts are presumed to entail. As far as his arguments go, if we
find our institutions unsatisfactory we might eliminate tort or private law
entirely. If we are to have them, however, then they must take a certain
form. The problem with his formalism is not, then, that it seeks to reduce
normative questions to ones of structure, but that it simply ignores norma-
tive questions completely. It thus marginalizes itself from the debate and
in doing so invites doubts about its relevance. Why should we care?
The answer may have something to do with the concept of integrity.
For the formalist, the integrity of the institution is everything. Institu-
tional integrity is a matter not of substance but of structure. The structure
in turn is given by the logic of the relevant concepts. For the instrumental-
ist-economist, institutional forms lack any inherent integrity. They are
pliable instruments in the pursuit of abstract economic goals. Their integ-
rity, if they have any, is bound up with their capacity ultimately to secure
those goals.
In the picture I am sketching, integrity is a property of institutions over
time. It is captured in the story of how institutions, designed by humans
for social ends, transform themselves over time to serve changing concep-
tions of their purposes in ways that recognize the constraints of en-
trenched practice and the meaning(s) of the concepts central to those
practices.
36. Cf Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955).
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